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I
Plato undertook in the Republic to show that “it is in every way 
better to be just than unjust” (Book II, 357bl — 2). What did he mean 
by this? I would like to focus on two relevant questions. 1) Did he 
believe that invariably the more just a person is, the better it is for 
him? We should prefer this way of putting the important question to 
asking, as is commonly done, simply whether being just is good for 
one. A philosopher might reply to this question affirmatively, meaning 
thereby that a person who is just is better off than a person who is 
unjust. But that would still not answer the question that I am posing, 
which is whether Plato held that each and every increase in one’s 
degree of justice is good for one or, as we might say,1 in one’s interest. 
2) Did Plato hold in the Republic that its being good for one is the 
only basic reason, or the only overriding basic reason, for doing any 
particular thing or being any particular way? In the case o f justice, the 
question is whether he held that its being in one’s interest to be just is 
the only basic reason, or overriding basic reason, for being just.
To these questions I shall defend an answer that is somewhat un­
orthodox though by no means unheard-of, that according to Plato in 
the Republic, there is one highly unusual but philosophically important 
case in which, in a certain circumscribed sense, being more just is less 
good for a person than being less just is, and, second, that in that case 
there is another reason beside self-interest, and overriding it, for being 
more just rather than less so. So my answer to both questions as I 
posed them is negative, though only for the one case in question. In 
this paper, I shall give this answer a defense restricted to a discussion 
of the Republic itself.2
1 I shall use “is in one's interest” as equivalent to “is good for one” even though 
the former, modem phrase reveals Plato’s thought less clearly, because it obscures 
the connection between “good for one” and “good simpliciter”, to be discussed.
2 A discussion o f other dialogues (notably, in my view, the Symposium, the 
Phaedrus, the Timaeus, and the Theaetetus) would not only show whether any
This case arises, I believe, for nobody that you or I will ever meet 
or need to persuade to be just, but only for the rulers of Plato’s ideal 
city, who are also philosophers, when they arrive at the end of their 
education. According to Plato they will then suspend their purely 
philosophical activity and work for a time at governing the city, even 
though it would be more in their interest to continue philosophizing. 
Their reason for doing this — to put it very roughly at first — is that 
having become philosophers and having gained full knowledge and 
understanding of the Good, they realize that although this course of 
action would not be good fo r  them, by comparison to continuing to 
philosophize, a) it is good simpliciter, and b) its being good simpliciter 
in a certain way overrides, as a reason for action, its not being good 
for them. Since they have no other motivation more efficacious than 
that reason in determining their action, they govern the city.
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II
I say that this interpretation is unorthodox primarily because of its 
negative answer to my second question above.3 Most commentators 
take Plato to think that ultimately one’s own interest is the only reason 
for doing or being anything.4 So they answer the second question
like conclusion could be defended outside of the Republic, but would also test 
the conclusion for the Republic itself. Unfortunately, such a discussion would be 
too extensive for the confines of this paper.
3 This interpretation, however, or something like it has not lacked advocates, 
including recently Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford 1981. 
I defended it, in less detail than here, in my Companion to Plato's Republic, 
Indianapolis 1979, hereinafter CPR. Observations that seem to me essentially 
similar are to be found, for example, in Gregory Vlastos, “The Theory of Social 
Justice in the Polis in Plato’s Republic”, Helen F. North, ed., Interpretation o f 
Plato, Leiden 1977, pp. 21 and perhaps 33; and an account that is difficult for 
me to characterize but that seems to me to bear important affinities is given by 
John M. Cooper, “The Psychology of Justice in Plato”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 14 (1977), 151 — 157 (cf. CPR , p. 196). I regard my account as going 
back to Moore (cf. infra, n. 31) and beyond, and indeed I would argue that it is 
present, in its essentials, in some of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato in Eudemian 
Ethics I, 7 — 8.
4 Among recent interpreters see, e.g., H. A. Prichard, Duty and Interest, Oxford 
1929, reprinted in Prichard, Moral Obligation, and Duty and Interest, Oxford 
1968; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford 1960; Terence Irwin, 
Plato’s Moral Theory, Oxford 1977; Hans Reiner, “Platons Begriindung der 
Ethik”, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung, 35 (1981), 223 — 229. This general
affirmatively. Since they think that Plato is trying to persuade people 
rationally to be just without exception, they think also that he must 
believe he can show that being more just is always in one’s interest. 
So they think that the answer to the first question must be affirmative 
too. Here, although some of them think the affirmative answer is 
supported independently by the text, others hold — rightly in my 
opinion — that Plato‘s words on this subject indicate that in the case 
described above, the rulers do act justly against their own interest. But 
then they must think that Plato is inconsistent, in suggesting that 
reason always follows self-interest, but that in that case, if the rulers 
are following reason, reason opposes self-interest to follow justice.5 I 
myself think that they are right about the text, but wrong about the 
inconsistency. On the account I am defending, Plato thinks that in this 
one case, reason must follow what is good simpliciter over what is 
good for oneself, and so follows justice.
To begin with, in Book VII, and especially in 519 — 521 and 540—541, 
Plato sets us a comparison that the rulers make having to do with 
the relative choiceworthiness o f the activities of philosophizing and 
governing the city.6 The questions are what this choice is a choice
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view goes back at least to Kant’s claim that all Greek ethics was “eudaimonistic”.
I think that it is adopted by George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of
Socrates, London 1888, vol. IV, p. 106 (but p. 70 makes me less sure). The same
view, but with an important extra twist, is also adopted by Richard Kraut (see
infra. n. 16).
5 For example, Adkins thinks that Plato is caught in a conflict here, from which 
he is unable to extricate himself {op. cit., pp. 290 —293).
6 I am willing to dismiss the idea that is sometimes held (e.g., by W. K. C. Guthrie, 
A History o f Greek Philosophy, vol. VI, Cambridge (England) 1975, p. 502) that 
the rulers are actually forced, presumably by their colleagues, to govern the city. 
This bizarre eventuality would obviously require a substantial mechanism far 
beyond anything that Plato comes close to describing or even hinting at. It proves 
nothing that at 539e3— 4 Plato expresses the requirement that the rulers govern 
the city by the phrase dvayKaax^oi dpxeiv. No one doubts that the Greek word 
dvayKaaxeoi can mean something other than actual compulsion, as by their 
colleagues. That it does mean something other than that is made clear by several 
facts. First, the agents o f the “complusion” mentioned in the passage are clearly 
not their fellow-rulers, but “we” the founders o f the city, who are discussing the 
matter, who are laying on them the requirement that they govern (520a8, ... 
£poCnev rcpoaavayicd^ovTeq 521 b7, dvay»cda£i<;; 519c8 —9, fj^ieiepov 8fi 
gpyov ... dvayicdaai; cf. 519d2 —7, 8 —9). Second, the notion of dvdyKTi is used 
to express, in the same breath with the requirement that the rulers govern, the 
requirement that they look to the Form o f the Good (519c8—d2, 540a6-rbl), 
which no one could think was literally something to be compelled by their 
colleagues. Third, the indications o f “unwillingness” to govern on the part o f the
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between, and what the grounds are on which it is made. To take the 
first question first, so far as I can see, the choice is clearly pictured as 
being made between two alternative continuations of their lives to the 
point at which the choice is made. The whole matter is brought up in 
the context of the statement that this is the time at which, if Plato’s 
scheme is to be fulfilled, they must return to the city (519d4 —7 ff., 
520cl ff.) and the question is whether at that point they will consent 
(520d6 — 8). The issue is then cast as one o f how ruling will be regarded 
by those who are about to rule (520d2 — 3, ol iieMovxec; ap^eiv, and 
521 a l, zolq  jieMoixriv ap^eiv). So it seems clear that even if the rulers 
are making other comparisons too, they are at least making this one 
between two options they have about how to continue their lives to 
date.
It might be argued that this cannot be their choice, on the ground that one of 
these options, that of continuing to philosophize, is not open to them. For it might 
be thought that only the smooth running of the city, for which their intervention is 
required, makes possible whatever philosophizing they have a chance to do. But 
this is not Plato’s view. For one thing, Kraut has argued convincingly that Plato at 
this point (unlike, e.g., 445d) is thinking that there is a group o f rulers, and does 
not suggest that the failure of any one of them to take on the task of governing 
must cause the city to collapse.7 Even more important, Plato makes clear that 
although a philosopher fears living in a city governed by people worse than he 
(Book I, 347b5—d8, esp. c5), nevertheless a life of philosophy is possible outside 
of the ideal city (ibid., and 496a—499a). Moreover this point is emphasized in the 
present passage, where Plato stresses the necessity of not allowing philosophers to 
do what they do in other cities, namely, to refuse to return to “the Cave” to share 
the toils and honors, for better or worse, of other people (519d4—7, 520a9 — b4).
It is also sometimes suggested that the rulers make their comparison between 
their own actual lives, which consist of (after preliminaries) first philosophizing and 
then ruling the city, and another sort o f life, lived in a possible but not actual state 
of affairs, in which they inhabit the “isles of the blest” (540b) and can philosophize
rulers is not suggested to be the kind of unwillingness that is to be overcome by 
force, but, as 346e7 — 347a3 shows, by attention to the relevant considerations. 
These include “persuasion” (rceiGd), 519e4) and also “necessity” (& v &y k t i , ibid.), 
but the necessity there is imposed by the law (v6 i^o<;, 519el), which “we” are 
establishing (520a8). The necessity, that is, is simply the legal requirement that 
we establish in explaining how the city is to be set up; and the rationale of the 
requirement is clearly something that the rulers are supposed to understand and 
follow, even though they do so, as I shall argue, because it is a requirement of 
justice, and through that indirectly of the Good (540a8 — bl); (cf. infra. n. 39), 
not because it is good for themselves.
7 Richard Kraut, “Egoism, Love, and Political Office in Plato”, Philosophical 
Review, 82 (1973), 330-344 , esp. 332-333 .
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without the need to rule. This seems to be the suggestion o f Murphy.8 It seems 
clear, however, that Plato’s actual remarks about the “isles of the blest” have nothing 
to do with the rulers’ choice, but rather are meant to describe their situation after 
they have finished ruling and indeed after they have died.
The idea motivating the foregoing suggestion can, however, be more effectively 
defended, once we see what is really at stake in determining the possibilities that 
the rulers are comparing. According to the interpretation that I am advocating, they 
are comparing their lives under the two options confronting them. One option is a 
life led as theirs has been to date, continued by taking their turn at governing; the 
other option is likewise a life led as theirs has been to date, continued by further 
philosophizing and no governing. In my view, they judge the former option less 
good for themselves, but better simpliciter, and they choose it because its being better 
simpliciter seems to them properly to override its being less good for themselves. 
But if one wishes to deny that they choose a course less good for themselves than 
another possibility open to them, it is possible to argue in one of two ways.9 (A) 
When they compare the value o f the first option, it could be argued that they 
compare it not to that of the second option that I have given, but rather to a life 
(which cannot under the circumstances be theirs) in which they philosophize exclusi­
vely without ever coming under the necessity o f ruling. Since (for reasons we shall 
examine) Plato disparages the life in which a philosopher lives under the rule of 
others who are less capable (347b —d), the supposition must be that the superior 
life of philosophizing is lived in circumstances not ever described in the Republic. 
But at any rate the point would be that in the rulers’ judgment, such a life would 
be better than the life that is destined to be actually theirs. (B) The other possibility 
is to argue that the point of the comparison is to hold that a life devoted exclusively 
or primarily to ruling, i.e., what one might call the political life, is the best life. On 
this interpretation, Plato’s point in disparaging ruling is not to claim that the life 
of philosophizing and then ruling is worse for the rulers than the life of philosophiz­
ing alone, but rather simply to claim that the life of ruling is worse than the life of 
philosophizing and then ruling. This latter claim, of course, is compatible with 
saying that philosophizing and then ruling is better for a person than simply 
philosophizing, so again the conclusion that the rulers sacrifice their good when 
they rule would be avoided.
Although both of these interpretations incorporate contentions that Plato would 
undoubtedly accept, it does not seem to me that they could represent all of what 
he is saying about the comparison made by the rulers. Clearly he does think, as (A) 
maintains, that a life of pure philosophy is better for one than a life o f philosophy 
followed by governing. Likewise he does think, as (B) maintains, that a life of 
philosophy followed by ruling is better for one than the purely political life. But
8 N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation o f Plato's Republic, Oxford 1951, p. 53, n.2. 
See also Terence Irwin, review of my CPR, Philosophical Reviewt 89 (1980), 
64 0 -6 4 7 , esp. 643.
9 I owe these suggestions respectively to Irwin, ibid., supplemented by a private 
communication, and to an anonymous referee for this journal.
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even if he does mean to express both of these views in this passage, it seems to me 
clear that he means to express in addition a comparison between the two options 
that I have described as continuations of the rulers' career to date, continuations 
that he seems to me plainly to be portraying the rulers as trying to evaluate.10 Unless 
he might thereby elucidate that evaluation, it is difficult to see what the point would 
be of the comparisons in either (A) or (B). As we have seen, one of his chief points 
in this passage is to show how his scheme avoids the deleterious effect on a city of 
having rulers who hope to gain by governing it and who therefore compete with 
each other to do so (520dl —4, e4 — 521 a8). To show how is rulers might in contrast 
be reluctant to rule, it would seem of little use to have them reflect merely either 
(with (B)) that a life o f ruling alone, which in any event they cannot have since they 
have already been philosophers, would be worse for them, or (with (A)) that a life 
of philosophy with no obligation of justice to rule, which equally they cannot have 
in their circumstances, would be better for them. To be relevant to their choice, 
such reflections would have to be supplemented by some judgment about the relative 
values of the two alternatives that actually are open to them. I think we must 
therefore conclude that the two alternatives that the rulers assess must be, as 
continuations of their lives to that point, going down to the city to govern it, and 
continuing to philosophize.
That given, it is evident what the judgment of the rulers is held by 
Plato to be. It is that fo r  them continuing to philosophize is better. 
This interpretation seems to me to be supported by 520e4—521 a2 
(especially by the word djisivco, “better44, with the Dative, xolq \ieXXou- 
aiv dp^eiv, “for those who are going to rule”). Here the contrast is 
made with rulers in ordinary cities, who unlike Plato’s rulers approach 
their ruling “lacking their own private goods (dyaOoov i8i(ov)” and 
thinking that they must “snatch the good (xdyaBov dprcdi^eiv)” from 
the city (521a4 —6; cf. 520dl). The same conclusion seems to me to be 
indicated by 519d8 —9. After Socrates has said that the rulers must 
not be allowed to continue philosophizing indefinitely but must govern 
the city, Glaucon asks, “Shall we then not do them an injustice, and 
make them live a worse life when they could live a better one (teoiticto- 
jisv xetpov jv, 8ovaTdv atnroiq 6v dp^ivov)?”. Socrates immediately 
replies to the charge of injustice, in the first clause, by saying that the 
requirement of governing is indeed just. But he says nothing to deny 
the presupposition underlying that charge, given in the second clause, 
that they are making the rulers live less well than they might.
But even if the points so far considered seem to support the present interpretation, 
it might still be argued that the interpretation forces Plato into a contradiction that
10 One might think that the word J3(o<;, “life”, at 520e4 and 521 b l, suggests a
comparison of complete lives rather than continuation o f their lives, but it is
clear that the word need not mean a complete life (see, e.g., Laws 732e —733a).
he could scarcely have tolerated.11 For he explicitly says that it is just for the rulers 
to return to govern the city (520el, a6—cl), and he must presumably mean to imply 
by this that it would be unjust for them to refuse to do so. But in Book IV, at 
443e—444a, he had held that an unjust action is one that upsets the harmonious 
and just condition of soul under which each o f its parts performs its own function 
and none encroaches on the role o f any other (443c—d). From these two passages 
taken together, it would seem to follow that a refusal to govern the city would 
necessarily upset the justice and the harmony of their souls. But if, as seems plausible, 
the harmonious condition o f soul is identified or closely associated by Plato with 
happiness or well-being, as we shall see later, then it would seem to follow 
that the refusal to govern would necessarily make a ruler less well off. So if Plato 
held that the rulers, their situation being as it is, would be better off if they 
philosophized rather than governed, then he would seem to be contradicting the 
conclusion of this implication of his other statements.12 Consequently, it might be 
argued, we have a powerful reason for not attributing to Plato the view that it 
would be better for the rulers that they continue to philosophize.
But the reasoning leading to the contradiction is by no means secure. There is 
in fact in Plato’s account o f justice and harmony in the soul a clear reason why he 
would not have to accept the conclusion that the rulers’ souls would be made less 
harmonious, in the relevant sense specified in Book IV, by philosophizing rather 
than ruling. Unlike all of the psychological conflicts which in Book IV lead Plato 
to postulate the various “parts” of the soul (435c—441c), the deliberation over 
whether to philosophize or to govern would have to involve considerations and 
aims arising from within a single part of the soul. For Plato clearly assigns to reason 
both the desire to philosophize and the desire to order and manage other things, 
including the city, in accordance with what it apprehends about the G ood.13 Perhaps 
Plato ought to have postulated a distinction within reason between a part that wishes 
to philosophize and a part that wishes to govern and order the city, but he did not 
do so .14 Accordingly, any conflict that there might be between these two desires 
could not be manifested, in his psychology, as a lack o f harmony among parts of 
the soul, and consequently there appears to be no way in which a decision to act 
in accordance with one desire or the other could give rise to the sort of disharmony 
that Book IV associates with injustice of soul. This conclusion may seem surprising, 
but it can be made more understandable by considering it in another way. The
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11 For sharpening this issue I am again indebted to Irwin and the referee.
12 There is a variant o f this argument according to which unjustly refusing to rule 
would be, not a cause of a less good condition of soul, but a symptom of it. This 
variant can be met by a response analogous to the one given.
13 See, e.g., Raphael Demos, “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic?”, Philosophical Review, 
73 (1964), 395 — 398, reprinted in Vlastos, ed., Plato // , Garden City 1971, pp. 
52 — 56; Vlastos, “The Theory of Social Justice”, p. 33; and my CPR, pp. 23 — 24, 
4 7 -4 8 , 5 5 -5 6 , 191-196.
14 The distinction would of course be similar to the one formulated by Aristotle 
between theoretical and practical wisdom, and to the Kantian one between 
theoretical and practical reason.
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harmony of soul that is in question in Book IV involved, as seemingly both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition (443e6 —7, 442c5 —d3), the governing and 
ordering o f the other parts o f the soul by the reason. What we now see in Book 
VII, however, is a question about what the rule of the soul by reason actually 
consists in, given that there is the possibility, which the case of the rulers alone 
introduces, of two conflicting aims that reason might have. That is, the rule o f the 
soul by reason might consist in the soul’s being so ordered that the person philoso­
phizes as much as possible; or rule of the soul by reason might consist in the soul’s 
being so ordered that the person engages in wise and philosophically enlightened 
ruling of the city. But both of these things would be consistent with harmony of 
the soul as specified within Book IV.
For this reason, I think that it is important that in Book VII when Plato explains 
why it is just for the rulers to govern (520a6—cl), he says nothing about the harmony 
of the soul, but rests his argument entirely on the claim that the rulers owe recompense 
to the city for the education they have received. I take this to be substantial evidence 
that he did not think that he could invoke the notion of justice in the soul from Book 
IV to play a role in his argument. Of course, we might think that he ought to have 
extended his notion of harmony of the soul to take account of the conflict between 
philosophizing and governing, and that he ought to have said that refusing to govern 
would, and governing would not, introduce disharmony into the soul by producing 
disharmony within reason. But on closer consideration, it seems to me by no means 
obvious that Plato could have justified such a line o f thought. For given only that 
reason contains desires both to philosophize and to order things in accordance with 
the good, it is by no means clear why acting on the one desire should produce any more 
disharmony within the soul than acting on the other. The mere fact that the two desires 
coexist and cannot both be equally satisfied does not make either one of them any 
more or less disharmony-provoking than the other. If it be argued that not governing 
would be unjust, and that we have it from Book IV that an unjust act causes dishar­
mony in the soul, then the rejoinder is that, as already observed, the disharmony 
explained in Book IV is a disharmony among the parts of the soul, and the unjust acts 
there in question are the sort that wiLl produce that disharmony (see 443a, where the 
examples given are thefts, temple-robberies, and public and private betrayals). The 
extension of this idea in the suggested way to the situation in Book VII is not automatic. 
It requires argument, it seems to me, and not merely an unargued assumption, that 
disharmony would in fact be produced in a ruler’s soul by a failure to govern. And 
Plato gives no such argument. On the contrary, he maintains quite clearly, as I think 
we have seen, that philosophizing is a better activity than governing. If it be asked 
where he got this assumption, then the answer seems clear enough: it is a constant theme 
in his doctrine that philosophizing is the best and most pleasant activity there can be.
So I conclude that as far as Plato’s psychology is concerned, we have no reason to 
think that he is committed to holding that the rulers’ souls would suffer disharmony, 
and hence decreased happiness, by their continuing to philosophize rather than govern­
ing the city.
This conclusion is strenghtened, I think, if we look at the matter from the 
viewpoint of the ruler who is at the point o f deciding whether to philosophize or
govern. If we do not assume in advance that his or her decision must be made on 
the basis o f self-interest, and ask what the relevant considerations would on Plato’s 
view plausibly be, I do not think that we find anything forcing us to say that 
governing, which is what Plato says they wUl do, must necessarily commend itself 
to them on grounds of their own good. We have ruled out the idea that failure to 
govern would end the opportunity to philosophize, or put an end to the city. We 
have also ruled out the idea that failure to govern would introduce disharmony into 
the soul. Still, it seems that in contemplating their decision, the rulers might well 
be dismayed at the thought o f not aiding the city or repaying if for educating them. 
Fair enough. But the question is what the nature is of this dismay. I do not see that 
anything in Plato’s remarks requires us to picture it as regret that their own interests 
will suffer. Instead, it seems to me more likely, given Plato’s comparison of the 
activities of philosophizing and governing for the rulers themselves, as explained 
above, that their regret would be for the interests of the city and its other citizens 
rather than their own.15
Moreover, some of Plato’s language seems to me materially to support this 
conclusion. In 540b, he says that the rulers will think of ruling as necessary but not 
“fine” (KaXov): By itself this phrase seems to me ambiguous. But he also says that 
the rulers will rule “for the sake of the city (rfjc; ndXEtoc, eveica)”, and although this 
might conceivably indicate a goal o f the rulers that is an instrument for or a part 
of their own good, I cannot see anything in the passage to indicate such a thought. 
On the contrary, 540a9 — bl seems to me to tell against it. Here Plato says that 
using the Good as a paradigm, the rulers will “order both the city and its citizens 
and themselves (icai tioXiv Kai ISicbtou; Kai fcaoxoix; Koa|i£iv)”. If the word “order” I 
here has reference to the ordering of a city or a soul as explained in Book IV, as I 
think it must (cf. 539d4), then we seem to be without any indication that the 
ordering of their own souls will take any kind of precedence, in the minds o f the 
rulers, over the ordering of the city and the other people in it. Moreover I think 
the same thought is present in Plato’s original introduction of this issue of a ruler’s 
reason to rule, in Book I, 346e —347e. This is the passage where, as we saw above, 
Plato disparages the state o f a philosopher who is forced to live under the rule of 
those who are less able (347b —d): This passage might appear at first sight to support 
the view that the ruler in Plato’s city who refuses to govern would thereby be worse 
off. Closer inspection reveals, however, that the passage has precisely the contrary 
import. Plato says that good men engage in governing through fear of the “penalty” 
of otherwise being ruled by worse men (347b5—d2). So you might think that he 
means that any good man is himself worse off if he or she does not govern. But 
Plato immediately says that if  a city of good men should arise, they would compete 
to avoid ruling as men now do to rule (d2 —4). It is quite clear that under this 
supposition, the “penalty” for not ruling would not be in force. Even more impor­
tant, Plato next says that in such a case it would be clear that the true ruler considers 
not his own advantage (aujicpepov) but that of the ruled (d4 —6), and that “anyone
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15 I do not here enter into Plato’s view of the relation between the interest of “the 
city” and the interest of the people in it, as formulated, e.g., by Vlastos, op. cit.,
with knowledge would prefer to be benefited (dxpeteiaGai) by someone else rather 
than take the trouble to benefit someone else” (d6 —8). Even if Book I is agreed to 
stand somewhat apart from the rest o f the Republic, I would say that the combined 
effect of this passage and those in Book VII, including those in 540a —b just 
discussed, weighs very heavily in favor of the view that Plato’s rulers are not held 
to serve their own good by governing the city.
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Ill
If we hold that in making their choice the rulers are not motivated 
to do what is good for themselves, then of course we would like to 
know what they are motivated by. As I said at the start, I think that 
they are motivated to do what is good simpliciter. I have not begun to 
explain what this means, but before I try to give any explanation, I 
must deal with yet other problems that may be raised against the 
interpretation of the rulers’ situation that I am defending. These diffi­
culties arise mainly from passages in Books III, IV, and V.
In Book III, 412d —414b, Plato might be taken to imply that the good of the 
rulers coincides exactly with the good o f the city as a whole.16 Here, describing the 
selection of rulers from among the auxiliaries, Plato says that one must love (cpiXeiv) 
a thing if one thinks that the same things are advantageous (CTi)|i<p£p£iv) to both it 
and oneself and that its faring well (eft TCpdxxeiv) coincides with one’s own (412d); 
and for this reason the rulers must be people who will eagerly do only what they 
think is advantageous to the city (412d — e), and will retain the opinion that one 
must do (8eiv rcoietv) what is best for the city (412e, 413c): In Book V, 461 e —465b, 
there is a somewhat different thought. The rulers are described as standing to each 
other somewhat as the parts o f the body, and as not using the word “mine” to refer
16 Kraut, op. cit., using these passages, argues that Plato in effect makes a distinction 
between a ruler’s “proper” interest and his “extended” interest, which includes 
the interest of the city and his fellow citizens and fellow rulers. His claim is that 
although the rulers may sacrifice their proper interest in governing the city, they 
advance their extended interest. This is an attractive idea, but it seems to me to 
meet serious difficulties. First, it does not explain satisfactorily why a ruler ought 
rationally to pursue his extended rather than his proper interst. Kraut carefully 
gives Plato’s description in Books III and V of the training that will make the 
prospective rulers think of the city’s interest as coinciding with their own, but 
this, as I shall argue, comes before any conflict between the two breaks out, as 
it does in Book VII, and so does not help to explain why a ruler should think 
that when the conflict does break out, he will be pursuing his interest by pursuing 
his extended rather than his rational interest. Second, Kraut’s account does not 
seem to me to square with what I have argued to be the indications in Book VII 
that the ruler choose the life that is less good for themselves.
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to their own individual well-being or pleasure, but rather to regard the fortunes of 
each other as tantamount to their own. This idea involves a coincidence o f the good 
of a ruler with that o f the other rulers rather than that of the city, but at 465b8 —10 
the connection o f the good o f the city with that o f the rulers as a group is made 
fairly clearly.
But there seem to me to be substantial reasons against taking these passages to 
be in conflict with the interpretation o f Book VII that I have defended. The crucial 
fact is that Books III and V describe very different stages o f both the rulers’ careers 
from the one described in Book VII. Both of the former portray them as they are 
selected from among the whole group of guardians, including auxiliaries, before 
they have entered the intellectual phase of their training, and well before they have 
entered the philosophical part, when they first come to a full understanding of the 
Good. I take this to be important, because I take it that only at the philosophical 
stage of their training do the rulers come to comprehend the notion of what is good 
simpliciter and to regard it as overriding one’s own good. In Book V, a step is 
taken toward the eventual understanding of the Good in Book VII, by the partial 
obliteration in each ruler’s mind of the distinction between what is good for himself 
and what is good for the other rulers, but the rulers do not extend their notion of 
the good farther than to include their fellow rulers (465b8 —10 is not an inference 
that the rulers themselves draw). At the stage, then, there is no reason to think that 
the rulers have the full grasp of the Good that is their final goal. Moreover, since 
they have not yet engaged in philosophy (not until they reach fifty, according to 
540a), they are not yet in a position to realize that there is a sacrifice o f their good 
involved in governing, and indeed, so far as they are concerned earlier, there is no 
such sacrifice yet. So before the final stage of the rulers’ education, it is true both 
(a) that they are without the knowledge that would make them aware of a divergence 
between their good and that of the city, and (b) that as far as their condition to 
date is concerned, there is no such divergence. Accordingly there seems to me no 
reason to take Books III and V, placed in their proper context, to conflict with what 
is, as I take it, maintained in Book VII.
It is Book IV, however, that presents the most serious-seeming 
difficulties for the interpretation of Book VII that I am advocating. 
For it has been urged that in Book IV, Plato both holds that a person’s 
self-interest is the only rational ground for action, and that he presents 
the conclusions o f this book in such a way as to preclude, if he is to 
be at all consistent, any later suggestion that there might be good 
reason for a ruler to do anything detrimental to his or her self-interest. 
I shall attempt to show that these views are mistaken.
Although in Book IV and elsewhere Plato urges that reason should 
rule in the soul on grounds of self-interest, I do not think that he 
ever says anything to suggest that reason can never bring any other 
considerations to bear. Irwin says17 that in Book IV, “Plato identifies
17 Irwin, op. cit.> p. 641.
the soul’s best condition with the one that benefits it (cf. ai)|i(pep0VT0<;, 
442c7)”. In Grube’s translation, which seems to me accurate enough,
And we shall call him wise because of that small part of himself which ruled in
him and made those declarations, which possesses the knowledge of what is
beneficial to each part, and what is to the common advantage of all three.18
I do not see here the identification of the soul’s best condition that 
Irwin mentions, or any implication that “a choice of something against 
my interest could not be approved by a properly-working rational 
part”.19 It seems to me that what Plato says here, which is perfectly 
consistent with the interpretation I am defending, is that to be wise is 
to be ruled by that part of the soul that declares what is fearful and 
what is not (the allusion is to cl — 3), and knows what is in the interest 
of the parts o f the soul both severally and collectively. It seems to me 
that, on Plato’s view, the reason does indeed have this knowledge. 
What seems to me lacking here is any claim that this is all that the 
reason has, or that knowledge of what benefits it is the only ground 
for calling a soul wise. Likewise, when Irwin says that in 445a5 —b4, 
“Glaucon agrees that an unjust life is not worth living (P icotov) when 
it lacks health”,20 it seems to me that this is both true and consistent 
with what we have seen in Book VII. For the notion of health in the 
soul here has just been explained simply in terms of which parts of 
the soul will dominate and be dominated (444b —d), without any 
implication, so far as I am able to see, that all considerations beside 
self-interest must either yield to it or be absent from reason. There is 
no reason to deny that the soul of the ruler who sacrifices self-interest 
by ruling rather than continuing to philosophize is indeed healthy in 
precisely the sense that he has in mind here.
I would agree that if  all we had of the Republic were Books I — IV, 
then if we attempted to pin Plato down on what considerations operate 
within the reason, we would have no evidence for anything but some 
kind of self-interest, and so would not know about any rational con­
sideration weighing against self-interest. But then too we would not 
know all he thinks there is to know about self-interest either, since we 
would not know much about his view of the pleasures of philosophizing 
and a number of other important things. But given that we do have 
the books after Book IV, and given that there is a clear reason why
18 Plato: The Republic, trans. by G. M. A. Grube, Indianapolis 1974.
19 Irwin, ibid.
20 Irwin, ibid.
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Plato would wish to wait until them to explain the notion of goodness 
that can override considerations of self-interest, I do not think that 
from the absence of that notion from Book IV, we can infer that there 
he thinks that a properly working reason must always choose according 
to self-interest. The point is that by the end of Book IV we still are 
lacking important parts of his view about what reason does and how 
it works.
But there is a further argument that might be advanced for saying 
that Book IV rules out the present interpretation of Book VII. For 
many commentators believe both that at the end of Book IV, Plato 
purports to have given a complete argument that being just is in one’s 
interest, and also that just before the end of the book, in 444a —e, 
Plato does present an argument that he would regard as sound for 
that conclusion. If these things were true, then although they might 
not absolutely preclude his going on in Book VII to cite one case in 
which acting justly was not in one’s interest they would still make that 
eventuality far less likely.
It seems to me, however, that the aforementioned account of the 
end of Book IV can be seen, in spite of its currency, to be incorrect. I 
think that it can be shown that Plato there neither claims to have given 
a complete argument that it is good for a person to be just (nor indeed 
a complete argument of any kind for being just), nor gives an argument 
for that conclusion. Let me now try at some length to show this.
As it happens, 444e7 —445b8, the passage crucial to determing what 
Plato claims to have shown in Book IV, is in need o f discussion anyway, 
apart from present concerns, because different translators give quite 
different ideas of what it means, apparently noticing only rarely that 
it is problematical. Some give the impression that Plato says that he 
has now shown that it is better for a person to be just than unjust, 
while others give the impression that, having treated certain vital 
preliminary issues, he is now about to begin the main task of showing 
this. It seems to me that the latter view can be shown to be right.
At first sight, the case might seem straightforward. The text seems 
to present us with Socrates saying that we must consider whether it 
profits one “to act justly, to engage in fine pursuits and be just” 
(Grube’s translation), Glaucon replying that the issue seems laughable, 
given that justice is a kind of health (444d —e), and Socrates then 
saying that although it is indeed laughable, we must not give up the 
effort to show that justice does indeed profit. That is in fact in rough 
outline what I think the passage does say, and I think therefore that 
it does imply that the investigation into whether justice profits is in a
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sense only now being launched in earnest. But certain difficulties have 
to be cleared up before we may rest assured about the matter.
The most severe difficulty arises from 445b5 — 7. One possible reason 
for Glaucon’s saying, just before, that it is laughable to investigate the 
matter might be that this has already been proved, and interpreters 
adopting the opposite interpretation to mine have taken these lines to 
confirm that view. Grube’s translation typifies this way o f taking them:
Ridiculous indeed, I said, but as we have reached the point from which we can
see the state of these things most clearly, we must not give up.
If the idea is in fact that we can already “see the state of these 
things most clearly”, (olov is  CTacpeatata), then it suggests that the 
demonstration has already been given, and if this is so, then of course 
there must be room for doubt that we are only now on the point o f  
beginning the demonstration. But there are two obstacles to taking the 
passage in this way. The first lies in the words &AX Clearly they
have adversative force. Given that Socrates has already said that we 
must investigate whether justice profits the just person (e7 —a4), and 
Glaucon has replied that this investigation seems to be laughable 
(a5 —b4), it seems hard not to take the adversative phrase, following 
the admission that it is (or perhaps seems) laughable, and introducing 
the statement that they must not give up, to indicate that they really 
are going to engage in just the investigation, laughable or not, that 
Socrates mentioned. But if they are going to engage in that investiga­
tion, and if furthermore they must not give or become tired, then it 
would be very odd, to say the least, if they were gathering their strength 
for an investigation into an issue that they have already settled. Such 
a situation would seem to call instead for a remark like, “Well, yes, it 
is ridiculous, but remember that we only have one demonstration, and 
our adversaries may require another, stronger one”.
I think that the foregoing consideration is decisive, but only if we 
can also explain what is meant by the words that Grube and others 
take to mean, “we have reached the point from which we can see the 
state of these things most clearly”. Here there are two possible re­
sponses. The first is that even if this translation would be correct, it 
needs not mean that we have already got a demonstration of the 
profitability of justice. It can equally well mean that we have reached 
a point from which we are able to see the state of things, i.e., able to 
gain a demonstration on the matter, though we have not yet done so. 
Even on this way of translating the lines, this way of taking them is 
recommended by the argument of the previous paragraph, and es­
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pecially the exhortation not to become weary. But it seems to me 
impossible even that this would be the correct translation, or the 
correct way of construing the grammar of the passage. Shorey’s correct 
translation reads,
“Yes, it is absurd”, said I, “but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, 
we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover with the utmost possible 
clearness that these things are so.”
Shorey appends the remark, “oaov ... KcmSeiv is generally taken 
as epexegetic of eviaCGa. It is rather felt with ou %pi\ d7ioKd|ivsiv.”21 
From Burnet’s punctuation, with a comma after eXr|M>0ajiev and 
none after e^ei, it appears to me that he construed the sentence in the 
same way. Grammatically it is far the easier way. There is nothing 
abnormal about oaov as adverbial after ou %pi\ drcoKdiiveiv, nor about 
otov T8 (sc. rival) as epexegetic o f oaov.22 On the other hand, oaov  
as epexegetic of evtaOGa is grammatically very peculiar, and has under­
standably called forth efforts to alter the text — though unnecessary 
ones, given the obvious other interpretation of oaov.23 Under the most 
straightforward construal, therefore, the text says, not that we must 
avoid weariness because we can see the state of things as clearly as 
possible, but that we must avoid weariness until the point of being able 
to see the state of things as clearly as possible.
To clinch the point, just consider the impact of the phrase oTov 
is  aacpeaxaxa on the opposing interpretation. Why must we avoid 
weariness? On that interpretation, it can only be because, although we 
have our demonstration o f the profitability of justice, we need another 
one or a better one or at the very least a clarification of the one we 
already have. Where could we, on such a view, now have arrived? 
Perhaps to a point where we can see the state of things clearly, or even 
very clearly indeed. But to a point where we can see it otov xe 
aacpeaiaia, as clearly as possible! That seems clearly impossible.24 So
21 Paul Shorey, trans., Republic, vol. I, rev. ed., London 1937, vol. II, London 1935; 
see vol. I, p. 420, n.d.
22 On the infinitive with oaov see Smyth, Greek Grammar, rev. ed., Cambridge/ 
Mass. 1956, secs. 2003, 2497 (not, by the way, 1086 — 1087, 1091, which are 
irrelevant, contrary to what one might suppose from the note ad loc. by John 
Adam, ed., The Republic o f Plato, ed. 2, Cambridge (England) 1963), and LSJ j 
s. v. oaot;, IV. 1. j
23 See Adam ad loc., who keeps oaov, and holds without any argument or parallel 
that eviauOa here can mean erci xoaotttov.
24 And because it is clearly impossible, Grube, like other translators who interpret 
the passage as he does, tries to soften and alter the force o f otov ts CTatpsataxa, 
by translating it “most clearly” instead of “as clearly as possible”.
again we are evidently far better off taking 5cov ... &7iOK&|iveiv as 
Shorey does, and recognizing that we have not yet had our demonstra­
tion of the profitability of justice.
But at this point we have to deal with two problems. One is to 
explain what is laughable about the attempt to show that justice is 
profitable (445a5 with b5), if it is not that the demonstration has 
already been given. The other is to make clear that what was already 
offered in 444a—e is not the very demonstration in question. Let us 
take the latter problem first.
The usual construal of this argument holds that it is based on an 
alleged parallel between justice and health, o f the type that Plato 
sometimes appeals to elsewhere (e.g., at Gorgias 504a —505b). On this 
account, the argument really amounts to nothing beyond saying that 
justice is like health and health is good for one, so justice must be 
good for one.25 This is such a poor argument that one might well hope 
fervently that Plato did not advance it, at least not as his main 
demonstration that justice is beneficial. And in fact there is no such 
argument in the passage, nor indeed any other to the conclusion that 
justice is good for the person who has it. This fact is difficult to accept 
when one has the common interpretation firmly fixed in one’s mind, 
but it seems to me that a careful examination of the passage makes 
the point clear.
In fact, the line of thought in 444a—e is this. Starting with conclu­
sions already reached about what justice is, it attempts to derive 
characterizations of injustice (alO —b9) and of just and unjust action 
(cl — e5). Nowhere in the argument, and in particular not at its conclu­
sion in 445e, is it explicitly said, let alone concluded, that being just 
or acting justly is good for a person. Indeed, words like d^eivcov and 
Xoaixe^eiv, which would be required to make such a point, are absent 
from the passage altogether, and do not appear until 445al, at the 
start of the passage just examined, which asks whether it profits a 
person to act justly, but does not conclude yet that it does. Instead, 
after saying that we now have discovered the just man, the just city,
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25 See, e.g., J. D. Mabbott, “Is Plato’s Republic Utilitarian?”, Mind, N.S. 46 
(1937), 468—474, revised and reprinted in Vlastos, ed., Plato // , pp. 57 — 65, esp. 
pp. 61—62; Vlastos, “Justice and Happiness in the Republic”, Vlastos, ed., op. 
cit., pp. 66—95, esp. p. 69; Anthony Kenny “Mental Health in Plato’s Republic”, 
The Anatomy o f the Soul, New York 1973, pp. 1 —27, esp. 8 (though p. 9 suggests 
that the argument is only adumbrated rather than actually advanced); Annas, 
op. dr., pp. 168 — 169.
and justice, Plato says that we must next examine injustice (alO — 11):26 
This he does (bl —9), concluding that it is a condition of soul (contrary 
to what he has characterized justice as being) in which parts of the 
soul perform various functions not their own, and the natural roles of 
ruling and ruled parts are not observed (note <puaei in b4). Next he 
says that now that justice and injustice are clear, just and unjust action 
should be so too (cl — 3). But Glaucon asks, “How so?” (c4), and in 
answer to this question the last phase of the argument is given (c5—e6). I 
Here, then, is how the argument of 444c5 —e6 goes. (A) Socrates is 
made to say that just and unjust actions stand to the soul exactly as 
healthful and unhealthful things stand to the body. But Glaucon again 
expresses puzzlement (c5 —7), and this fact indicates that, as is quickly 
confirmed, the parallel between justice and health is not simply being 
assumed as a premise of the argument, as is sometimes thought, I 
(B) It is agreed as obvious that healthful things implant health and 
unhealthful things implant sickness (c8 —9). (C) Accordingly, Socrates 
says, doing just things implants justice, and doing unjust things im­
plants injustice (clO —d2). This again is not based on an assumed 
parallel of justice and health, but rather a thesis already maintained 
at 443e4 — 444a2.27 (D) Socrates then says, drawing on a medical 
commonplace, that to produce health is to produce a state in which 
constituents of the body rule and are ruled in accordance with nature, 
and that to produce sickness is the reverse (d3 —7). (E) Socrates then 
says that to implant justice is to bring about a state in which the 
constituents of the soul rule and are ruled in accordance with nature, 
and that to produce injustice is the reverse (d8 —11): Once again, this 
is not derived from a parallel between justice and health, but is taken 
as a point argued for earlier, independently of any analogy with health 
(441 e4 —5, 443dc5, 444b4 —5): (F) It is then inferred on this basis (apa, 
d l3) that virtue is a kind of health and beauty and good condition, 
and badness (K aida) is sickness and ugliness and weakness (d l3 — e3): I 
Thus Plato argues for the analogy between virtue and health, on the 
ground that they are both conditions produced by things maintaining 
a natural order among constituents, respectively, of the soul and the 
body. (G) From this the conclusion is finally inferred, that because
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26 Why? Because all along the issue has concerned a comparison of justice and 
injustice, not merely an assessment of justice (357bl ff.).
27 For present purposes it does not matter whether or not the explanation of just 
action there is intended as a stipulation about the use of expressions for “just 
action”; cf. I. M. Crombie, An Examination o f Plato’s Doctrines, New York 1962, 
vol. I, pp. 282-283 .
virtue has just been shown to be a kind of beauty, beautiful activities 
are conducive to virtue, and correspondingly base or ugly activities are
Although it is clear what the conclusion of this argument is, there 
is some room to quarrel with the way in which Plato makes it. He has 
already said that a just person will consider “just and beautiful” 
(Sucaiav Kai KaA,f|v) that action that maintains the just condition of 
his soul (443e4 — 6): In 444a—e he is partly explaining the basis of that 
usage. But he also, in 444e4 —6, seems to be advancing a further step, 
which is that beautiful (KaXa) activities are conducive to virtue, and 
that all base or ugly activities are conducive to badness (r a o a ) of 
soul. This is part of his attempt to square his usage of the terms “just” 
and “unjust”, in their primary application to a person’s soul, with the 
ordinary usage that applies them primarily to actions — an attempt 
that has been criticized by Grote and Sachs.28 But whether the attempt 
is at all successful or not, it is clear that this is what 444a—e is directly 
concerned with, not the effort to show that one is better off if one is
If, then, Plato does not after all give a full argument at the end of 
Book IV for saying that one benefits by being just, and likewise does 
not claim to have given such an argument, we can once again ask why 
he says (445a5 with b5) that the coming attempt to show that justice 
is profitable is laughable, if not because a demonstration of its conclu­
sion has already been given. But in a sense the investigation obviously 
is laughable. Although the discussion of health has no probative force 
by itself, we can see as well as Glaucon did the kind of thing it plainly 
suggests, given Plato’s account before it of what justice in the soul 
involves. It is evident that, on reasonable, though as yet unarticulated, 
Platonic assumptions, there is something good for a person about 
having a soul whose parts rule and are ruled — i.e., whose motivations 
dominate and are dominated — in the way Plato has specified in his 
description of justice. Glaucon is made to share enough of Plato’s 
outlook to be able to see that. But what neither Glaucon nor we can 
claim to see solely on the basis of the discussion to this point is exactly 
what is good about having a soul in this condition. That will not be 
possible until, first, the state of the just soul is more fully described in 
Books V —VII, together with the importance to that state of the
28 Grote, ibid., pp. 99 —110, and David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic”, 
Philosophical Review, 72 (1963), 141-158 .
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knowledge of the Good, and, second, until the state of the unjust soul 
is more fully described in Books VIII —IX (and also, I think, X).
Although I think that we can safely conclude that Book IV neither 
attempts to prove nor claims to have proved that justice benefits its 
possessor, and therefore we can also rest secure in the interpretation 
of Book VII expounded earlier, it will corroborate the point if we very 
briefly consider what Plato adds in later books, particularly Books 
VIII —IX, to what he has said in Book IV; in order to show that being 
just does make one better off. Book IV presents justice in the soul as 
the condition in which each of its parts performs its own natural 
function or task, and shows how it can be seen as an aspect of a kind 
of unity and harmony and lack of strife. But this kind of harmony 
among parts performing their functions is not all there is to happiness 
as it is construed by the end of Book IX. Nor ought it to be. What is 
added in Books VIII — IX is the idea that each part of the soul has, in 
addition to its proper function, also its own desires and its own 
pleasures that are largely consequent on the satisfaction of those 
desires. What Books VIII —IX argue for is not merely a connection 
between justice, as the performance by each part of its function, and 
some generalized harmony of functioning parts, which is all that Book 
IV gives us, but a connection between justice, as performance by each 
part of its function, and a certain kind of balance o f  desires and 
pleasures, under which the desires o f one part will not block those of  
another part from their natural fulfillment, and the pleasures of one 
part will neither be squelched nor allowed to grow beyond their natural 
levels so as to interfere with those of other parts.29 Whether one agrees 
or not with Plato’s general approach to the concept o f happiness or 
well-being, one can easily appreciate that what Books VIII —IX add 
to it is essential, and that what Book IV says about it is incomplete. 
Certainly it seems more reasonable to hold that happiness is a balance 
or harmony of desires and pleasures than to hold that it is, more 
abstractly, simply a harmony of functioning parts of whatever sort.30 
Thus, Books VIII — IX do add something substantial to Book IV on
29 See CPR, pp. 213, 221, 223 -2 2 4 , 233. When I wrote CPR, however, I did not 
see the difference between VI and VIII — IX that I am not pointing out.
30 I do think, however, that Plato closely connects, and comes close to identifying, 
the goodness of a person (or a city, or indeed virtually anything else) with a quite 
abstract kind o f unity, or harmony among parts (see CPR , pp. 39—40,110—111). 
This is o f course something that Moore, to whom I compare Plato’s views on 
goodness infrat does not do.
this topic, and something that on philosophical grounds is much 
needed.
I think that it is reasonable to conclude from this discussion o f Book 
IV, therefore, that that book contains no obstacle to saying, as I have 
tried to give some grounds for doing, that later parts o f the Republic 
introduce another consideration beside self-interest into the sphere of 
considerations entertained by reason.
But there is finally another objection to the present interpretation of 
Book VII, arising not so much from any particular passage in any particu­
lar book, but from the general impression given throughout the Republic 
that Plato is trying to persuade us all to be just by showing us that it is in 
our interest to be so. Surely, it may be objected, the pressure of the 
exception exemplified by the rulers would undercut that effort. But is 
seems to me that this objection loses its force when it is considered clearly. 
For remember that according to the present interpretation, the exception 
is the only one that Plato admits to the general rule that one benefits 
by being just, and moreover it can apply only to those people who are 
philosopher-rulers in an ideal city, at the stage of having comprehended 
the good at the end of their training. But they, if such there be, would be 
aware of the exception without reading the Republic, and would accord­
ing to Plato decide to govern the city; whereas any people for whom the 
Republic would be a useful persuasion could hardly be in a position where 
the exception would apply to them. For all o f these other people, even if 
they were incapable o f appreciating the fact, Plato thinks it holds true 
that the more just they are the better off they are. So there seems to be 
no call to say that the exception constituted by the rulers undercuts the 
aim of the work at all.
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IV
I shall conclude with a short discussion, inevitably incomplete and also 
fairly conjectural, of the notion that I have attributed to Plato under 
the label o f the “good simpliciter”, and of his views of the relations of 
that notion to that o f what is good fo r  some person.
A first approximation of the notion can be gained for contemporary 
readers by recalling some views o f Moore, who evidently thought 
(rightly, in my opinion) that he owed them to Plato.31 Moore contends
31 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge (England) 1903, pp. 96 — 105, and esp. 
p. 98. For a helpful discussion of some relevant aspects of Plato’s notion of the
that the relative notion of a thing’s being good fo r  so-and-so, as 
opposed to the non-relative notion of a thing’s being good (simpliciter, 
as I have put it), really makes no sense. The only sense he will grant 
to saying that something, such as the pleasure experienced by so-and- 
so, is good for so-and-so is that it is good and is in so-and-so, or in 
so-and-so’s mind, which really dispenses with the relative notion of 
goodness, and keeps only the relativity expressed by the word “in”. 
Moore’s reason for holding this position seems to be based on his 
concept of what it is to have a reason for something, and his connection 
of goodness to that concept. He thinks that if so-and-so’s pleasure can 
legitimately be said to be good, then anyone must equally have reason 
to promote it. If we could say that a thing was good for X in the sense 
usually intended, Moore thinks, then we would be implying that it was 
reasonable only for X to promote it, without implying that everyone 
equally had reason to promote it. But Moore clearly thinks that it 
cannot strictly be reasonable for one person to promote something 
without its being equally reasonable for anyone to promote it. In effect, 
Moore is denying that the notion of reasonableness can properly be 
relativized to individuals, and is insisting that the notion o f goodness 
should be tied to a non-relative notion of reasonableness. So he conclu­
des that the idea of something’s being good for one person but not for 
another, strictly taken, makes no sense.32
42 N ich o las  W hite
good, see G. Santas, “The Form of the Good in Plato’s Republic”, Philosophical 
Inquiry, 2 (1980), 374-403 .
32 Moore was criticized for these views by C. D. Broad, “Certain Features in Moore’s 
Ethical Doctrines”, P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy o f G. E. Moore, LaSalle 
1942, pp. 43 —67; see esp. pp. 43 —57, with Moore’s reply, ibid., pp. 611—615, 
and also Broad, “G. E. Moore’s Latest Published Views on Ethics”, Mind , N.S., 
Vol. LXX (1961), 435 — 457, esp. 455 — 457. Related issues were discussed more 
recently by W. D. Falk, “Morality, Self, and Others”, Hector Castaneda and 
George Nakhnikian, eds., Morality and the Language o f  Conduct, Detroit 1963, 
pp. 25 —66, and in William K. Frankena, “Recent Conceptions of Morality”, 
ibid., pp. 1—21, esp. pp. 8 —11, 11 — 12, and still more recently again in such 
writings as Thomas Nagel, The Possibility o f  Altruism , Oxford 1970, and Bernard 
Williams, “Criticism of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 
Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge (England) 1973. Discussion of 
Moore’s views about goodness has shown signs of coming back into fashion, 
especially in connection with related problems about objectivity, subjectivity, and 
points of view; see, e.g., the defense of a version of the Platonic-Moorean type 
by Donald H. Regan, “Against Evaluator Relativity: A Response to Sen”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 93 — 112, and the response by Amartya 
Sen, ibid., 113 — 132. In Platonic discussions it has also appeared in Sarah 
Waterlow, “The Good of Others in Plato’s Republic”, Proceedings o f the Aristotel-
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It seems to me that Plato’s notion of the good has in common with 
Moore’s the idea that goodness, in the strict sense (as will be explained 
shortly), is not a relative notion, as that of what is good for so-and- 
so is, but absolute, and is likewise reasonable equally for everyone to 
promote. In Plato’s view, I think, a full understanding of the notion 
involves an understanding of this non-relative notion, and a recognition 
of the way in which it overrides (as will also be explained shortly) what 
is merely good for a particular person, such as oneself. It must be 
admitted that the central parts of the Republic, notably Books VI and 
VII, do not spell out this idea, and so one must be cautious in using 
what evidence there is. One might appeal, as an explanation of his not 
expounding it more clearly, to the fact that he says that the notion is 
very difficult to grasp (505d —e), and rather than simply laying out his 
views of it in plain terms, insists that even his rulers can comprehend 
it only after a long course of preparation and philosophical training. 
But of course one can hardly defend a particular interpretation of the 
notion simply by saying that Plato found the notion too difficult to 
expound clearly. Some more positive evidence is obviously required.
With all due hesitation, I would say that support is forthcoming 
from the following consideration (I hesitate not least because a full 
treatment of this matter would require attention to other works, and 
I am here confining myself to the Republic). First, it seems undeniable 
that the rulers are said to govern using the Good as a paradigm, and 
that this consists in trying to make the city as good as possible, not, 
as we have seen, in trying to produce as much good for themselves as 
they can. But we must remember that for Plato the Form of ths Good 
is meant to be the property exemplified by all cases o f goodness, not 
only those expressed in terms of profit, advantage, interest and the 
like, which seem to us manifestly relative notions, but also those cases 
consisting in the possession of virtue or virtues, as when such a thing 
as a city is said to be good (e.g., 427e, 433c —d). This seems strange 
to us, who are accustomed to regarding these two sorts o f case as 
exhibiting different uses of the term “good”, but that is plainly not 
how Plato saw the matter.33 So it seems most likely that trying to cause 
the Good to be exemplified means primarily trying to produce things 
that are good, not for oneself or in that sense from one’s own point 
of view, but in a non-relative way, or, as it were, not from a particular
ion Society, LXXIII (1972 — 1973), 19 — 36, esp. p. 31 —35, and Annas, op. cit., 
esp. pp. 322-334 .
33 See CPR, pp. 4 6 -4 7 , 176-177 , 191-195 .
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perspective.34 And if this is so, then it seems that the Good which is 
thus being exemplified is most likely to be a non-relative sort of 
goodness.
The question next arises how we are to understand the connection 
in Plato’s view between relative uses of the word “good” and the non­
relative use in which it is associated with the Form of the Good. 
Although I can discuss this issue by no means fully, I think that the 
most plausible account involves using a certain general interpretation 
of Plato’s theory of Forms which has been elaborated in recent times 
by Owen and Vlastos, according to which the Form F  bears the 
predicate “i 7” without “qualification”, including particularly certain 
relational qualifications, whereas sensible objects that are F  bear the 
predicate only with a qualification.35 On this account, for example, 
the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful without qualification, whereas 
beautiful sensible objects are beautiful only with certain qualifications, 
e.g., in certain circumstances or relations or at certain times or places. 
The analogous claim would the hold for the Good. But it is part of 
Plato’s theory that an understanding of the use of a predicate in 
application to sensible objects is dependent on the understanding of 
the predicate as applied to the Form.36 At the same time, he maintains 
that something to which the predicate “F ” applies unqualifiedly can 
be said to be “really” (6vtco<;) and “strictly” (&Kpi|5co<;) Ft whereas the 
sensible objects that are qualified F  are not so (see esp. 476d — 477a, 
478b—479e): It is not hard to see in these ideas the suggestion that — 
to be quite impressionistic — the notion of something’s being good fo r  
so-and-so is a sort of vague version o f the notion o f a thing’s being 
good simpliciter, which is (and would seem to us if we could grasp it 
fully) a clear and precise notion. This is quite different from Moore’s 
view, that the former notion really makes no sense (cf. n. 31): It is not, 
on the other hand, a very clear suggestion, and I doubt that we can
34 For a contrasting view, see esp. Reiner, op. cit., who holds that Plato’s view of 
goodness is fundamentally perspectival (in my rough sense), in spite o f its close 
links with the notion of k <xA .6v , which Reiner argues is a non-perspectival notion 
in Plato (rightly, I think, in view of Smyp. 21 Oe sqq).
35 See Richard Lewis Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic o f  Plato, 2nd ed., London 
1901, pp. 193 — 194. More recently see, e.g., G. E. L. Owen, “A Proof in the Ilept 
TSecov”, Journal o f  Hellenic Studies, 1957, Pt. 1, 103 — 111; Gregory Vlastos. 
“Degree of Reality in Plato”, R. Bambrough, ed., New Essays on Plato and 
Aristotle, New York 1965, pp. 1 — 19; Alexander Nehamas, “Plato on the Imper­
fection o f the Sensible World”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (1975), 
105-117 .
36 See esp. Phaedo 72 — 76 with Rep . 523 — 525.
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make it clear without a full understanding o f Plato’s view of the relation 
between Forms and sensibles. For although the contrast between a 
qualified and an unqualified application of a predicate certainly seems 
to represent something that he had in mind, much more would have 
to be said to show with real clarity how it would illuminate the relation 
between the two uses of “good”.37
Still we can have a rough sense of why Plato thought that the 
exemplification of the Good by the city and what benefits it is somehow 
more important and more worthy of pursuit than the exemplification 
of the Good in what benefits a particular ruler. For certainly something 
seems right about the idea that a “wider” perspective judges what is 
good for the city as a whole than judges what is good for an individual 
or group within it. And I think one can see how it could be thought 
that what is judged from this “wider” perspective is somehow closer 
to what is judged to attach to the Form of the Good when it is judged 
good simpliciter. The notion is roughly that the more “broadly” the 
Good is exemplified, the closer one comes to an unqualified exemplifi­
cation of it such as one finds in the Form.38 Now given that the more 
unqualified exemplification is the more “real” or “genuine” one, and 
given too that (as Plato clearly held39), the more genuine exemplifica­
tion of something itself rationally desirable is more worthy of promo­
tion than a less genuine exemplification, it follows well enough that 
promoting what is good for the city will be more worthy of being 
promoted than what is merely good for an individual in it.40 Obviously
37 The crucial question is whether he thought that the introduction of “qualifica­
tions” to the application of a predicate changed the meaning of the predicate, 
and if so, how the relation between the two meanings should be explained. It is 
clear that this was a controversial matter in the Academy: see G. E. L. Owen, 
“Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle”, I. During and G. 
E. L. Owen, eds., Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Goteborg 1960, 
pp. 163 — 190. I believe that this issue, and related issues about the way in which 
predicates apply to Forms unqualifiedly — which I think Plato equates to their 
applying non-perspectivally — is importantly elucidated by the results o f E. N. 
Lee, in W. H. Werkmeister, ed., Patterns in Plato’s Thought, Assen 1976.
38 The notion that “broader” exemplifications are more desirable, ceteris paribus, 
than “narrower” ones is in effect relied on by Demos, op. c i t and Kraut, op. 
cit., pp. 339, 341 —342. The question I am raising is what this notion of breadth 
really comes to, and how it could be related to what it is rational to promote.
39 See Rep. 5 8 5 a -e  with CPR, pp. 230 -  231.
40 I take it that in Plato’s view, exemplifying the Good in anything wider than a 
city would be far beyond human capacities especially given the human material 
that one would have to work with (CPR , pp. 83 — 84, 151 — 152). The demiurge 
of the Timaeus, on the other hand, could set his sights higher (29e—34b), and
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all o f these steps are in need of further elucidation,41 but their Platonic 
character seems clear enough, and they allow us to see how Plato 
might well hold the rulers would think that it was better, simpliciter, 
to govern the city than to do anything else that was good for themselves. 
It is not that they would think that asking what was good for oneself 
made no sense, as Moore maintained, but that posing that question, 
as opposed to the question what is good simpliciter, and making it the 
basis of one’s decisions about what to do, involved employing a dim 
version o f a concept that was both clearer, once one came to understand 
it, and more rationally important to see exemplified in the world, than 
the dim version that one previously focused on.
I need hardly reemphasize that this account of course must be 
partially conjectural, and arises from the need to piece together the 
sort of view that would have a chance of making sense of the things 
that Plato says. Still, it seems to me plausible and well supported as 
these things go. But what it sets out to explain seems to me more 
firmly established, and that is the idea that in Republic VII, with no 
contradiction from other parts o f the work, Plato does describe his 
rulers as sacrificing their own good by their willingness to govern the 
city.
could produce something that more fully exemplified (and resembled) the Forms, 
at least collectively, than a human being could.
41 An important further task would be to explain how Plato might hope to make 
the transition, remarked on at the end of n. 6, supra, from the “attractive” notion 
of goodness to the “imperative” element of the notion of justice that he sometimes 
makes use of.
